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# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

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## GREAT POWERS MUST AGREE ON AIMS OF INTERVENTION IN EUROPE

IT would be the ultimate tragedy of a tragic half-century if to the devastation and suffering of two wars should now be added in Europe the horrors of civil strife, and conflict among the United Nations concerning the use to be made of military victory over Germany. The only hope Germany has of escaping defeat is disunity in the mighty coalition ranged along its borders. Can the Allies effectively dash this hope?

When Secretary of State Stettinius, in his declaration of December 5, said that the United States expected the Italian people, and "to an even more pronounced degree" the governments of the United Nations in liberated territories, "to work out their problems of government along democratic lines without influence from outside," he brought out into the open one of the most burning issues of this war. Blunt as his words seemed to the British, in the long run more good than harm will be done if questions about the future of Europe, which is of life and death concern not only to the liberated peoples but also to their liberators, are threshed out frankly.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR DISORDER? The discussion now raging on both sides of the ocean, however, would be greatly clarified if the statesmen and editorial writers of the United Nations could agree on definitions of such words as "democracy," "communism," and "order." Mr. Churchill, in his address to the House of Commons on December 8 offered a rough and ready definition of democracy as "fight first, vote after." The British Prime Minister has proved himself a great and eloquent historian—but he is perhaps better equipped to assess the history of the British people, with their unusually fortunate tradition of centuries of constitutional monarchy, than that of other, less fortunate nations. Victor Emmanuel III and his son, Prince Humbert, both of whom accepted Fascism, or King George of Greece, who supported the Rightist régime of Pre-

mier Metaxas, cannot in all fairness be compared to British monarchs of modern times. Nor is it historically accurate that disorder and disunion in Europe can be traced exclusively to Leftist elements. The ferment at work in Belgium, in Italy, in Greece, is due to many causes other than Communist influence. No responsible person acquainted with Europe between the two wars could believe for a moment that the liberated peoples would unquestionably welcome back individuals or institutions they blamed, rightly or wrongly, for their defeat and the sufferings they had endured under Nazi rule. And no one familiar with human nature could assume that men and women driven to the point of sheer desperation by hunger, misery and disease would peacefully settle down to wait for orderly elections while, before their very eyes, the régimes they had opposed almost as much as they had opposed the Nazis returned to power, however temporarily, under Allied protection.

The British government does present a strong argument when it insists that it intervened in Belgium, Italy and Greece not to oppose Leftist elements, but to maintain order. All of us here, as we watch mounting Allied losses with deep anxiety, favor any measure the military authorities regard as essential for the protection of the lives and supply lines of Allied troops. But what is meant by "order"? Might not order be more readily restored by provisional governments that command the confidence of liberated peoples than by exiled governments which do have the asset of legitimacy but have fallen into disfavor in their homelands? The example of France, where the government of General de Gaulle—the only one so far in liberated territories free of any ties to pre-1939 régimes—has succeeded in maintaining relative order and speeding reconstruction, is not without significance in this respect.

BRITAIN'S STRATEGIC STAKE. Actually, the British may be primarily concerned with maintaining

in power governments that might be expected to grant Britain strategic bases or other advantages. This is an entirely natural concern on the part of the British at this stage of the war—just as natural as Russia's demand, on strategic grounds, for Eastern Poland, the Baltic states, and bases in Finland. From the American point of view it is disheartening that Europe seems breaking up once more along the lines of old-time alliances—with Britain trying to acquire spheres of influence in the Low Countries, in Italy and Greece; Russia in Eastern Europe; while France and Britain both seek reinsurance against post-war Germany by alliances and pacts of mutual aid with Russia. The United States, however, is not in a strong position to criticize either Britain or Russia on this score until it can assure both powers, and all the other United Nations, that we shall unequivocally help them achieve security against German resurgence.

The British, moreover, can argue that they are by no means the only ones to intervene in the internal affairs of other nations. The United States has advised Chiang Kai-shek to reach an agreement with the Communists, and has used diplomatic and economic measures to induce a change of government in Argentina. Russia, too, has declared that it seeks "friendly" governments in countries along its western borders, as well as in Iran, and has openly intervened in Poland.

**INTERVENTION FOR WHAT?** When this contention is advanced, critics of Britain tend to say: "Ah, but the United States [or Russia], is supporting the 'right' people." The matter of who are the "right" people is obviously a matter of subjective judgment. What can be said with some assurance is that, so far as one can see, Russia is swimming with the tide of events in Europe, while Britain is swimming against it in some areas where it happens to have special strategic interests. The crux of the matter, however, is that none of the three great powers who, under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would have primary responsibility for international security, really favors a complete hands-off policy—and none of them can do so as long as the world lives in its present state of anarchy. The United States does

not, in fact, favor a policy of nonintervention. We do intervene, when we think it is to our interest—although nowhere have we gone as far as the British have in Greece. Our policy would be clearer if the American government would implement Mr. Hull's declaration of April 9, in which he said this country supports everywhere forces favorable to democracy. This would still call for a definition of democracy—because in our sense of the word neither Chiang Kai-shek, nor the Chinese Communists, nor Russia, come under the heading of democracy, and we may soon be faced with the question whether the methods by which the Polish Committee of Liberation or Marshal Tito's régime achieved power were democratic. In the final analysis, when we say we support forces that favor democracy, we really mean forces that favor the United States as against Germany and Japan. Moreover, without intervention by the United States in the form at least of relief, it is entirely possible that such forces may not be able to achieve the democratic goals urged by Mr. Stettinius.

If it were possible to take a Gallup poll of American opinion on this subject, it probably would be discovered that an overwhelming majority of our people favor the establishment, outside our borders, of institutions similar to our own, and oppose the use of American forces to restore governments that appear to us as reactionary, and most of all to bolster up monarchies. But, as the experience of this war has demonstrated, it is not enough for us and the British to declare that we favor democracy or sympathize with it if we either refuse to support it where it tries to get a toe-hold, or even occasionally support its enemies. Only by defining our objectives about the future of Europe can we hope to find a real basis for agreement, eventually, with Britain and Russia. If Russia—as Mr. Churchill seems to fear—should gain influence in European areas of strategic importance to Britain, this will be due not to the peculiar virtues or the superior Machiavellianism of the Russians, but because Britain and the United States will have allowed the cause of democracy to be defeated by default.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## **LATIN AMERICANS HOPE FOR OVERHAULING OF HEMISPHERE POLICIES**

As the threat of war in this hemisphere disappears, the United States faces the loss of its moral and political leadership in Latin America. Looking ahead into the post-war world, many Latin Americans fear that unless the system of regular, frequent inter-American consultations is revived and expanded, the whole façade of continental unity will swiftly collapse. If this happens, they hold that Washington will be to blame because of its inconsistent support of some Latin American dictatorships and censure of others; and, above all, because of its apparent belief that informing its American partner-states on

policies of vital importance to them all is equivalent to consulting with them. As the spokesman for the Good Neighbor Policy and the most powerful partner in the regional Pan-American enterprise, the United States must assume initiative in promptly calling an inter-American conference to settle the grave problems accompanying the transition to peace.

**ARGENTINA—FOCUS OF TROUBLE.** Argentina is the cancer in the hemisphere body. The threat of European Fascism may well spread from Buenos Aires to other Latin American countries. It is from Argentina that military coups attempted elsewhere,

with or without the connivance of the Farrell-Perón government, have derived inspiration. Until Argentina again becomes a democratic member of the Pan-American group, hemisphere relations will not improve. Many Latin Americans believe that until now the United States action against Argentina has been purely unilateral and—what is worse—ineffectual. While fundamentally they may not approve the practices of the Buenos Aires military clique, they have a latent fear that the United States may revert to "Big Stick" diplomacy; and this fear leads them to applaud Argentina's successful resistance to pressure from the United States.

Moreover, Latin Americans, noting the cordial relations between Brazil and the United States, are unable to explain to themselves why this nation can tolerate in one country the type of régime it attacks in another. Herein may lie one reason for their delay in reaching an agreement on Argentina's request for a conference to consider its case. Latin American chancelleries are fearful that if they decide on strong action of an economic or even military nature against the Farrell-Perón government, they will be establishing a precedent which some day may be used against their own countries. For, they ask frankly, how many of our Latin American governments are truly democratic? Washington's complaint against Argentina has been its failure to fulfill the Rio de Janeiro pledges of 1942 to break off diplomatic relations and sever commercial and financial contacts with the Axis, but Argentina has in their opinion, however grudgingly and tardily, complied with them all. But if a United States charge goes deeper, and concerns the constitutionality of the Buenos Aires régime, might it not be directed as well at Brazil, Paraguay, Bolivia and other governments which do not have a popular mandate? In any case, a considerable number of Latin Americans, whatever their feeling on the subject of Argentina, think that United States policy toward that country partakes too much of "interventionism" to be reassuring.

**RUSSIA—POSSIBLE COUNTERPOISE.** To protect themselves against possible imperialistic tendencies

on the part of the United States, the countries to the south may undertake in the post-war period to play the great powers against each other and so prevent any one of them from attaining pre-eminence in Latin America. It is no secret there that Britain and the United States have been unable to agree on their Argentine policy—and that their failure to do so is closely related to their respective trade aims in South America. The Buenos Aires government has been sedulously fomenting this division between its two greatest wartime purchasers. According to close observers of the Latin American scene, the country which stands to gain most from the divisions, both internal and external, that beset the continent is Russia. Diplomatic relations with Russia have been resumed by Cuba, Colombia, Uruguay, Mexico, Costa Rica and Chile; and even Brazil may shortly extend recognition. There is a certain feeling of affinity with Russia on the part of articulate elements of the great underprivileged mass of Latin Americans who feel the conditions under which they live approximate those in Russia in 1917, and that Russia may hold the secret of deliverance for them. Moreover, businessmen are also looking to Russia, as the only considerable market for Latin American raw materials outside of Britain and possibly the United States.

**WHAT PRICE THE GOOD NEIGHBOR?** If hemisphere relations are at their lowest ebb in a decade, they are by no means beyond improvement. The prospect of peace was bound to usher in a difficult period of readjustment, as North and Latin Americans again become aware of the vast psychological and cultural differences that separate them. They must now evaluate the measures concerted at the successive inter-American conferences to decide which of these were improvisations to combat the war emergency and which were a truly genuine prelude to continued collaboration. Following the recent reorganization of the State Department, Latin Americans look with new hope to a thorough overhauling of hemisphere policies. In an interview granted a Latin American press representative shortly before he became Secretary of State, Mr. Stettinius explicitly stated that a conference of American Foreign Ministers would be held prior to the United Nations conference on Dumbarton Oaks. Latin America needs the economic assistance of the United States—but on terms determined in a spirit of collaboration by all the American states.

OLIVE HOLMES

(The last in a series of articles on post-war Latin America.)

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
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# Washington News Letter



## AIR FREEDOMS CHARTED AT CHICAGO CONFERENCE

The international air conference at Chicago adjourned on December 7, after the delegates had concluded an agreement establishing an interim advisory council to deal with air transport in the post-war-period. They also drafted a series of documents which will go far toward insuring freedom of aerial navigation once 26 of the signatory governments have formally ratified them. Although the Soviet Union declined to attend the conference, a seat on the projected Interim Council of the Provisional Civil Aviation Organization has been reserved for that country. Apparently the Soviet government objects to the principle of freedom of innocent passage, which would permit foreign planes on regularly scheduled transport routes to fly over the territory of any country without specific negotiations between the interested governments. It was this problem of security which caused negotiators of the Paris (1919) and Havana (1928) air conventions to include in them the principle of the "closed sky," requiring country-to-country negotiation for passage of foreign planes over the territory of any nation.

### ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF CONFERENCE.

Freedom of innocent passage is provided in one of the four documents signed at Chicago, which together mark a long step forward in international agreement and in the removal of barriers to easy movement of aerial communication among the various countries. The major document is an international aerial convention, which would create an International Civil Aviation Organization to guide, but not control, air commerce. In addition, an interim agreement will govern international air communication until the close of the war. Another statement, known as the "two freedoms" document, guarantees the freedom of innocent passage and grants to the planes of all nations freedom to land in foreign countries for non-traffic purposes. A "fifth freedom" document would permit planes to pick up passengers and freight in a foreign land. The British object to this last "freedom," but there is good prospect that the other principles of the Chicago conference will win international acceptance.

So far as the United States is concerned, one important effect of the agreements is to strengthen the position of the State Department, which wants international air arrangements to be made a subject of government-to-government agreement. In the past, private companies, like Pan-American Airways, had

negotiated directly with foreign governments. For example, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., chief of the United States delegation at Chicago and retiring Assistant Secretary of State, testified before the House Committee of Merchant Marine and Fisheries on September 12 that Pan American had made contracts with Dutch Guiana, Jamaica, Portugal and Trinidad that excluded entrance into those countries of any other United States air line. Pan-American also agreed with Brazil, Argentina, New Zealand and the Belgian Congo that one airline in each of those areas should enjoy reciprocal flying privileges in the United States. These exclusive and reciprocal agreements concluded by private American air lines have presented diplomatic problems for the United States. Brazil, desirous of running an airline to Dutch Guiana, sought clarification from the State Department when it found that the Pan-American contract blocked the entrance of any other line into that colony. Our government was also disturbed by the fact that a private American corporation had undertaken to seek special privileges in the United States for a foreign country.

**BRITISH CONCERN OVER AVIATION.** Economic rather than political disagreements dragged out negotiations at Chicago beyond the four weeks it was originally thought the conference would run. Britain opposed "fifth freedom" landings except for debarkation, refueling and emergency purposes, and sought to include in the major agreement a clause comparable to paragraph four of the convention proposed in the British international air transport White Paper of October 8. This paragraph would have provided for "the elimination of uneconomic competition by the determination of frequencies [total services of all countries operating on any international route], the distribution of those frequencies between the countries concerned, and the fixing of rates of carriage in relation to standards of speed and accommodation." The United States, however, opposed any restriction of competition. Behind the British point of view lay apprehension that the United States, possessing more transport planes and operating more transport routes than any other country, might gain undue advantage in the international air transport field immediately after the war. However, the first steps have been taken to link all the countries in agreement on certain aspects of aerial commerce, and points which are still in dispute may be resolved on the basis of this understanding. BLAIR BOLLES

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